BFC chair responds to John Andrews’ allegations

I wish to respond to the letter published in your May 7, 2004 edition titled, “Is the Baffin Fisheries Coalition ignoring Inuit interests?” Under normal circumstances I would not use the media as a medium to respond.

However, when the information is false, malicious, misleading and is a personal attack on me, then I feel I have no other choice but to defend myself and set the record straight.

In 2001, which was the first year of harvesting 0A turbot, Baffin Fisheries Coalition had its first encounter with Mr. John Andrews. At that point, various operators were interested in fishing 0A turbot, but it was late in the season, therefore we chose to have Mr. Andrews and his associates fish for us. Under the terms of our contract, Mr. Andrews’ vessels were to offload in Canadian ports, which was the condition under which we received permission from DFO to use foreign vessels.

However, Mr. Andrews blatantly disobeyed Canadian regulations by allowing the vessel to offload its production in Europe. This created an issue of grave concern for BFC and the fishing industry in general in Atlantic Canada, who believe that if one wishes to operate in Canadian waters, then one must play by Canadian rules and regulations.

In 2002, BFC signed a harvesting contract with Mr. Andrews under the condition that the vessel was to be Canadianized. The conditions were as follows:

1. The vessel indicated has been Canadianized and subject to inspection by Transport Canada and did meet all the requirements necessary to allow it to fish in Canadian waters.
2. The harvesting agreement shall be for one year only, and is done without any future commitments for future supply.
3. The vessel is to meet Transport Canada guidelines by July 15, 2002. Should the vessel not meet Transport Canada conditions then BFC shall at its discretion transfer the allocation made to this vessel to another vessel of its choice.”

* On June 19, 2002, Mr. Andrews confirmed that the vessel would be on site by mid-July.
* On July 9, 2002, BFC requested from Mr. Andrews verification as to whether the vessel met Transport Canada’s regulations for Canadianization.
* On July 19, 2002 Mr. Andrews advised BFC that they were unable to give assurances that the vessel would be ready, stating: “We therefore are in agreement with BFC assigning the 1,000 tones (earlier assigned to us), to other vessels to catch.”

My question to you is this: Is this the kind of company that Nunavut wants to work with, if we truly want to develop Nunavut’s fishery?

This is the same individual who partnered with an Icelandic company to purchase a factory-freezer trawler that was built in 1965 with the hopes of joint-venturing with the BFC. At that point the BFC made it very clear to Mr. Andrews that it had no intentions for partnering and or joint-venturing with a company to purchase a vessel that was built in 1965. This type of vessel was not dependable and not accommodating for any crew that fished in northern waters. Is this the type of vessel we want to develop our fisheries? I think not.

It has been BFC’s policy to use a variety of harvesting methods to gain the maximum information from harvesting. Our goal was through using various gear types to find the statistics on: size of fish harvested; geographic area fished; depth of water fished; by-catch, etc.

In 2003, BFC wanted to decrease the harvest from trawlers and increase the harvest from hook-and-line vessels. BFC, however, through its call for proposals, was unable to attract sufficient proposals from Canadian hook-and-line vessel owners to fish in 0A. As a result of this situation, BFC applied for and received permission from DFO to use two foreign freezer hook-and-line vessels.

BFC was not interested in dealing with Mr. Andrews and the condition of his vessel.

Mr. Andrews indicated that he again submitted a proposal in 2004 and it was ignored, “Mr. Ward did not even respond to our proposal,” this is completely false, as verified by the following sequence of events:

* On January 20, 2004 I forwarded a copy of the request for proposal and terms of reference to Mr. Andrews.
* On February 5, 2004 BFC received Mr. Andrews’ one-page proposal for 2004.
* On February 6, 2004, I informed Mr. Andrews that his proposal lacked detail and that we required more information.
* On February 7, 2004 I received a two-paragraph response from Mr. Andrews.
* On February 16, 2004 I called Mr. Andrews and requested that we meet to discuss his proposal.
* On February 18, Mr. Andrews and myself met for lunch to discuss his proposal, and at this meeting I told him that his proposal was unacceptable.
* On February 18, 2004 I confirmed in writing the contents of our meeting of the same date.
* On March 8, 2004 Mr. Andrews confirmed to me that his position had not changed from his proposal of February 5, 2004: “Further to our recent luncheon meeting, this is to advise that the royalty per tonne proposed and terms outlined in our February 5, 2000, for turbot caught in area 0A in 2004 will, for the present remain the same, but we remain open to discussion of other options.”
* BFC at its recent board meeting discussed Mr. Andrews proposal and it was considered unacceptable.

Because of BFC’s dealings with Mr. Andrews in the past, I personally made sure in 2004 (as is evidenced from the above chronological order of events) that he received the information promptly.

With regards to the statement, “Mr. Ward appears to be the greatest colonial interest of all,” I wish to remind Mr. Andrews that I am an employee of BFC, with no ownership position whatsoever. I report to the board through the chairman.

With regards to his statements on the Senate report, I did not get the same understanding from the report as Mr. Andrews. There were some positive recommendations from the report and there were some recommendations that we could not agree with. Is this not the nature of most reports?

BFC’s objectives over its initial three years were very clear and it has made substantial progress towards implementing these objectives which are as follows:

* Exploratory fishing;
* Development of new inshore fisheries and emerging fisheries;
* Development of offshore fisheries;
* Recruitment and training for current and new jobs in the offshore fishing industry;
* Investment in a Nunavut fishing vessel;
* Lobbying for more access to other fishing quotas including turbot in 0B;
* Encourage scientific research; and
* Administration of the initiative, including preparing calls for proposals.

There is irony in the way in which the Senate committee went about dealing with the issue of quota allocations in Nunavut waters. Why was it that it focused on the exploratory fishery in 0A as compared to the tragedy of the historical allocation of 0B turbot (73% to southern interests) and shrimp in shrimp fishing areas 1, 2 and 3 (74% to southern interests) primarily going to non-adjacent licence holders?

We find it hard to comprehend why the committee focused on southern interests to make presentations on an exploratory 0A turbot fishery, knowing very well that it was their intention to move quickly to try and control this fishery as they had historically done in Nunavut’s adjacent waters.

Do you think the Senate committee would have gone out of its way to find Nunavut stakeholders to make presentations to it if it was doing a review of the crab and shrimp allocations in Newfoundland and Labrador’s adjacent waters or lobster in PEI’s adjacent waters? I do not think so.

BFC shall respond to the southern interests who have questioned the transparency of the BFC. The Nunavut fishery has become more organized, more vocal, more focused, and it must take control of the development of its own fishery in 0A and not allow the marginalization of its adjacent resources, as was the case in the 0B turbot fishery, and in particular the overall shrimp fishery in Nunavut’s adjacent waters.

The people of Nunavut can no longer sit idly by and see the fishery resources in its adjacent waters go to southern interests. The injustices of historical allocations in Nunavut’s adjacent waters – only 27 per cent of the 0B turbot allocations and less than 26 per cent of the overall shrimp allocation in its adjacent waters – must stop. BFC’s harvesting plans of going from harvesting agreements in 2001 to 2003, to charter arrangements in 2004 and 2005, to eventual vessel ownership are steps in the right direction. When you have control of your own resources you can control your own destiny and maximize the benefits to the Inuit of Nunavut.

In conclusion, it is obvious that Mr. Andrews has deliberately misrepresented the facts. I am confident that my credentials and ethics in the past and present can be put up to the test and withstand any scrutiny or testing that Mr. Andrews can administer. Mr. Andrews, can you say the same?

Jerry Ward, CEO
Baffin Fisheries Coalition