How much is that in real jobs?

After the Feb. 16 territorial election, it’s a certainty that the Government of Nunavut will continue to revamp its Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti, or “NNI,” policy.

It now has a blueprint to follow — contained in the first comprehensive review of the NNI, done by a team of officials from Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. and the GN, copies of which are now in the public domain.

The GN liked the team’s recommendations so much that it has already changed the NNI’s best-known feature — its bid adjustment formula. Companies listed as local Inuit-owned will now get larger competitive advantages when bidding for Nunavut government contracts.

Will this encourage the growth of Inuit-owned businesses? Will this create more jobs for Nunavut Inuit? Are the social benefits worth the extra costs imposed on government?

Right now, those are impossible questions to answer.

The NNI policy is, essentially, a subsidy program. And it’s also an exchange. Under it, the government agrees to pay extra money, if necessary, to subsidize Inuit, local and Nunavut companies. In return, the government hopes to encourage the development of more Inuit-owned and businesses, and more jobs and training opportunities for Inuit workers.

To meet its legal obligations under Article 24 of the Nunavut land claims agreement, the Government of Nunavut has no choice but to develop such a policy — or something close to it. That’s an issue that is beyond debate. And in a poverty-stricken region like Nunavut, it’s reasonable for government to use its spending power to generate economic growth.

But how many new jobs for Inuit have been created because of the NNI? How many new Inuit businesses have been created? And how much extra money is the territorial government spending because of the policy?

The NNI Policy Comprehensive Review document, tabled in the legislative assembly last week, does not answer those questions. There is no evidence that the NNI policy is a success, and there is no evidence that it is a failure. We just don’t know.

The NNI review team did a good, honest job, and it made many useful observations and recommendations. But it did not do a proper cost-benefit analysis of the policy.

The report, for example, tells us that in 2002-03, $16.7 million worth of contracts were subject to NNI adjustments.

But it does not tell us how many new jobs for Inuit have been created. And it does not measure, in real dollars, how much the NNI-generated policy is costing the Government of Nunavut, over and above what the government might otherwise pay.

Because of that, it’s not possible to calculate how much each NNI-generated job, or business opportunity is actually costing the territorial government. And, of course, it’s also not possible to calculate how much it’s helping Inuit.

This is vital information. The NNI is costing public funds that could be spent on numerous other useful social purposes, such as health care, education, corrections, and social assistance. It’s also vital to know so that the NNI can be compared to other ways of helping Inuit get business, job and training opportunities – such as tax credits, training and apprenticeship grants, or direct grants to business.

It’s not surprising, perhaps, that a lawyer-driven process like the NNI review would produce no economic analysis. With NTI legalists breathing down their necks every step of the way, it’s likely that GN bureaucrats are more worried about how their NNI policy might fare in a courtroom than how it might fare on a social and economic balance sheet.

The NNI is a well-intentioned policy. It’s probably a good policy. But without concrete economic evidence, it will always be vulnerable to criticism and a source of resentment for cynics. JB