A summary of the safety board’s findings

• The heavy cargo load and the vessel’s low freeboard made the Avataq vulnerable to shipping water on deck.

• Water accumulated on the afterdeck reduced the vessel’s limited stability, causing the Avataq to roll over and then sink.

• The involvement of RCC Trenton was delayed while Arviat residents conducted a land search and Nunavut Emergency Services in Iqaluit tried to figure out if the Avataq had actually sunk.

• The Avataq was not equipped with an MF radio or an “EPIRB” satellite locator device.

• The Avataq was not equipped with an automatically releasing life-raft or the type of immersion suits that would have increased the crew’s chances of survival in cold water.

• Even though it was known that vessels such as the Avataq were loading cargo at the Port of Churchill for destinations along the Kivalliq coast, safety concerns were not passed on to the appropriate authorities. No assessment was made to find out if the vessels were safely loaded or seaworthy for carrying cargo.

• The crew of the Avataq did not recognize the risks they were taking because they had no formal experience or training in cargo loading, and did not know about free surface effect.

• Southern Canadian standards have not been adapted for the protection of boat crews operating in the Arctic.

• Nunavut Emergency Services does not have clear procedures in place to ensure that Rescue Coordination Centres are notified promptly in search and rescue situations.

• Without formal training, northern small-vessel operators may not have the skills to safely abandon ship in cold water, and the knowledge needed to assess their vessel’s safety requirements.