Health Department’s 3rd-party review of water crisis uncertain

Update comes 2 years after residents told to stop consuming fuel-tainted water

A picture of the city’s water treatment facility. Two years after the Iqaluit water emergency, the Department of Community and Government Services has a completed review of its emergency response, while it’s unclear whether the Department of Health will still pursue its own third-party review. (File photo by David Lochead)

By Randi Beers

Two years after Iqaluit’s water emergency, Nunavut’s Health Department might not deliver on a third-party review it has promised into the department’s response to the crisis.

The GN issued an order on Oct. 12, 2021, telling Iqaluit residents not to consume the city’s water after fuel was discovered in the water supply. By then, people had been reporting their water smelled and tasted of fuel for 10 days. The order was in effect for nine weeks.

Dr. Michael Patterson, who was then the territory’s chief public health officer, committed in December 2021 to a third-party review of the Health Department’s response to the crisis. The review, Patterson said, would look at the department’s conduct in order to learn lessons on how to handle a similar situation in the future.

The Department of Community and Government Services was also mandated through the territorial Emergency Measures Act to review its own emergency response.

The CGS review, completed by Toronto consultant company DPRA on May 17 of this year, was provided to Nunatsiaq News on Wednesday. 

When asked Wednesday about the status of the Health Department’s review — the one Patterson promised in 2021 — spokesperson Danarae Sommerville said, “Health plans to work with CGS to determine what additional pieces are needed on Health’s end.” 

In an interview, Nunavut’s acting chief public health officer Dr. Jasmine Pawa would not go so far as to say Health’s review has been cancelled.

“We want to collaborate with CGS and the city to identify if we need any further consideration of some things not covered [in the CGS report,]” she said.

“There are processes within Health in how we decide to issue do-not-consume order, timeframes and more regulatory parts out of the scope of the CGS report.”

What’s in the CGS review

The CGS review pegs the start of the emergency at Oct. 12, 2021. It does not concern itself with the City of Iqaluit’s response to the initial reports of fuel-tainted water. 

DPRA reached out to 35 people to take part in the review. Nineteen responded. Of 13 current and former city officials who were asked to participate, five took part.

The report does not identify who did or did not participate.

It describes broken equipment and disagreements between the city and GN leading to delays in handling the crisis.

Coincidentally, states the report, CGS had just bought a mobile water treatment plant before Iqaluit’s water emergency. That piece of equipment had been tested but not yet deployed.

When officials attempted to use the mobile treatment plant, they came up against numerous problems.

It arrived damaged because it had not been properly winterized, the report said.

It also did not come with a generator or operator’s manual.

After spending $804,000 trying to get the plant running, CGS abandoned the project and turned to buying bottled water and a reverse-osmosis water purification system, which eventually was supplied by the Canadian military. 

Disagreements between GN, city delayed bypass installation

CGS also began preparations on Oct. 19, 2021, to help the city install a system to bypass the water treatment plant that would allow residents to resume using the city’s water, but a series of disagreements and miscommunications delayed its installation until after the emergency was over — in December of that year.

Complicating things was the city’s expectation that the do-not drink order could be lifted as soon as Oct. 28, 2021, after officials discovered a buried fuel tank near the plant was the probable cause of contamination.

“However, [Patterson] identified the need for additional due diligence, given the importance of rebuilding and maintaining public confidence in the city’s drinking water,” the report said. 

Patterson provided the city with a number of requirements to lift the order, including the installation of a bypass. 

CGS contractors completed their bypass design on Nov. 1 and presented it to the city on Nov. 8. The city expressed a number of concerns, including that the design could damage the city’s water infrastructure.

The city submitted its own bypass design Nov. 15, which received Patterson’s approval on Nov. 18. 

“But the CPHO’s eventual approval does not appear to have been relayed to the city,” the report said.

That information was not relayed until a meeting on Nov. 24, the report states.

The city confirmed it had begun construction of its bypass system on Nov. 29, but the project was not completed until January 2022 because of supply-chain and contractor issues.

Recommendations

The report concludes with seven recommendations, including updated emergency plans and legislation, regular emergency-response training, the procurement of an operational mobile water treatment plant and heated storage facility, better staff training, and communications staff fluent in Nunavut’s official languages. 

CGS told Nunatsiaq News in an emailed statement it agrees with the recommendations. 

The City of Iqaluit is also implementing the recommendations in the report, said city spokesperson Kent Driscoll in an emailed statement to Nunatsiaq News.

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(14) Comments:

  1. Posted by Quenching Accountability, Not Just Thirst: A Lesson Yet to be Learned? on

    The lessons from the Walkerton Ontario and Iqaluit incidents underline the importance of accountability, proactive management, and independent oversight in ensuring safe drinking water. Both cases show the need for robust regulatory frameworks, timely responses to contamination issues, and the value of third-party reviews or regulatory bodies in fostering transparency, trust, and effective crisis management. The establishment of a third-party drinking water regulatory body could be a vital step toward averting future water crises and ensuring public health and safety.

    With 25 communities under the monitoring of these departments, it’s crucial to move beyond a defensive stance and adopt a framework of accountability, especially on critical safety issues like drinking water. The establishment of an independent regulatory body in Nunavut could provide the necessary oversight, ensuring that water safety protocols are adhered to and that swift, effective actions are taken in the face of contamination risks, safeguarding the health and well-being of the community residents.

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  2. Posted by art thompson on

    this is a joke? right?

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    • Posted by Atatsiak on

      Not a joke, homeboy.

  3. Posted by Scotty W on

    I can’t wait until the real third-party review comes out and calls out the many lies in this report. Half of CGS will get fired.

    The GN needs to take accountability for their actions.

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  4. Posted by 😂 on

    😂

  5. Posted by Abney on

    “The CGS review pegs the start of the emergency at Oct. 12, 2021. After spending $804,000 trying to get the [mobile water treatment] plant running, CGS abandoned the project and turned to buying bottled water and a reverse-osmosis water purification system, which eventually was supplied by the Canadian military.”
    The GN started flying in bottled water on October 14th. The military was deployed October 22nd. So CGS planned/designed the install, shipped the system in, mobilized, constructed, installed, and attempted to commission a mobile water treatment plant in 2 days before they instead opted for bottled water? How big was this system and where was it? How many people were working on it? Was a pad constructed for it? Where did power come from? This is my first time hearing about this. It took 20 military personnel almost three weeks to get their system running and it was flimsy at best.

    “It arrived damaged because it had not been properly winterized, the report said.”
    The weather was above freezing (2-5 degrees) at the start of the emergency and hovered around zero for the latter half of October. Also, why does the GN own a non-winterized treatment system in the arctic?

    “Coincidentally, states the report, CGS had just bought a mobile water treatment plant before Iqaluit’s water emergency. That piece of equipment had been tested but not yet deployed. It also did not come with a generator…”
    How was it tested without a generator?

    “…or operator’s manual.”
    Where was the $804,000 spent if not on a specialist to get the system working? Why was it abandoned after only two(?) days? How was $804,000 spent in such a short period of time?

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  6. Posted by Robert on

    Very interesting how the report did not cover the City’s initial response prior to GN getting involved. I do recall the Mayor of Iqaluit very appropriately listening to City residents and advising against drinking the water. Unfortunately, as this offended GN officials he retracted and apologized when…guess what…he was RIGHT and he was the only one who (in my opinion) did his job, listening to Residents. But these independent reports will never be independent. GN will always narrow the scope to protect its “reputation”. Sad.

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    • Posted by Twisted history on

      Mayor Bell did not listen to residents over and over and over again for many weeks. He kept telling residents that the water was safe to drink despite repeated reports that the water smell and tasted like fuel. I appreciate that Kenny was simply restating what his staff were telling him because the city tests did not include hydrocabons as possible source of contamination.

      Problem is that Kenny did not only not listen to residents; he made fun of them. This was typical of Bell to dismiss and scoff at residents who he thought was trying to make him or the city look bad. He always cared more about his ego than anything else.

      Residents never got real or honest information about water contamination, how it was handled,, not just from the city but from the government of nunavut. Seems like we never will.

    • Posted by Aquatic on

      Do you recall him, several days before that, inappropriately insisting on Facebook that the water was safe and didn’t have hydrocarbons and said the test results were fine, when in fact the water had not even been properly tested for hydrocarbons?

      • Posted by Robert on

        Fair comment. You are correct.

  7. Posted by Hard Questions on

    Some hard questions need to be asked, this is simply unacceptable.

    Broken communications, communications staff who can’t communicate in the official languages (?!?), huge amounts of money thrown around with seemingly no plan or accountability on how it was spent or who was paid, seemingly optional participation in reviews in both CGS and the City, radio silence from elected representatives who were in office at the time.

    I hope to see the CGS Minister questioned in the upcoming session. I expect City Council candidates, which includes several incumbents who were in office at the time, to explain themselves.

  8. Posted by Not Over on

    The water crisis in Iqaluit is still not over.
    The water may, or may not, still have hydrocarbons in it, but it definitly tastes bad.
    Even filtering the water does not remove the bad taste.
    You can mask the taste by using the water to make juice from concentrate, but the high sugar content can lead to diabetes and/or goute.
    So, juice-from-concentrate is only practical for short-term transients.
    For Iqaluit’s permanent residents, it leads to major health issues and huge health care costs for the GN.
    This is one of those cases where there are almost no winners. Everyone loses, except the companies which sell medicine and treatment.
    Who is letting this situation continue, and why?

  9. Posted by Saif on

    The incidents in Walkerton, Ontario, and Iqaluit highlight the essential importance of responsibility, proactive administration, and autonomous supervision in guaranteeing safe drinking water. They stress the requirement for resilient regulatory frameworks, prompt reactions to contamination, and the significance of third-party evaluations for openness and efficient crisis management. Establishing an external supervisory entity dedicated to monitoring drinking water could be a pivotal measure in preventing future water crises and safeguarding public well-being. With jurisdiction over 25 communities, giving priority to responsibility, particularly in critical safety domains like drinking water, is imperative. here’s more Health com is your source for accurate and trustworthy information so you can
    make the best choices for your Health and wellness.

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